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Abstract 
The 1990s were marked with the transition process that aimed to transform the central 
command economies to liberal free market economies and the single party regimes to 
multiparty democracies. The result has been mostly the reproduction of the peripheral 
characteristics of the Balkans. The shortcomings of the process have been asserted as if the 
deficiencies were local and hence the Balkan countries were to blame for it. Few could predict 
that the core would be in crisis. The 2008 crisis in the core directly affected the periphery - the 
Balkans - where GDP decreased and unemployment and budget deficits rose up.  Following a 
decade of destruction through violence and a decade of destruction in the name of neo-
liberalism, the Balkan region has once again been experiencing peripheralisation. This study 
attempts to examine the way in which such a reproduction of the peripheralisation occurred. 
Keywords: Political economy, Balkans, transition, crisis, core-periphery.  
1. Introduction 
“… [Between the end of war and economic crisis] most states in the Balkans 
opted to rebuild by rejoining the liberal international economy. They 
established independent central banks, joined the gold standard and tried to 
attract foreign investors by keeping budgets tight and repaying their debts. 
French, British and American funds poured into the region. However, 
international capitalism was a hard task-master…” (Mazower, 2000: 128.)  
The Balkans have often been perceived as the periphery of Europe. In the 
late pre-modern period and early modern period, it was the common periphery of 
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Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, beginning with 16th century (Lampe and 
Jackson, 1982: 578). As a matter of fact, it can be said that at each stage, the newly 
independent Balkan states had seen the day with the claim of being a core 
European state, no matter if it was Serbia of 1878 or Slovenia of 1991. The 
eventual fate seems as post-pessimist despair as of March 2014, since the effects 
of the global economic crisis are still creating pains in the region, both in terms of 
macro-economic indicators and mere human life.  
In the quotation above, the war and the crisis that Mazower mentioned is not 
the Cold War and 2008 economic crisis. Notwithstanding its striking similarity to 
these later events, it refers to the I. World War and 1929 crisis.  Indeed, 
Mazower’s analysis concluded, also concerning the contemporary period, that the 
main threat to Balkan nation-state has come from the international economy, 
which ended “the old idea of socioeconomic transformation through the domestic 
policies of the individual state” (Mazower, 2000: 143).  This has been indeed 
observed most clearly after 2008.    
All that has been written about the effects of the 2008 global economic crisis 
in the region seems quite similar to the Great Depression of 1929. In the context of 
1929 (as well as of 2008), it was stated that the Balkan countries had been mostly 
exporting primary products, and were drastically influenced by the fall of the 
prices of primary products in the international market and by the decrease in 
international lending: “Previously, with credit easily available, interest rates low, 
and markets for produce seemingly assured…At the state level the policy of the 
1920s of borrowing foreign capital to cover trade deficits now became impossible, 
because export earnings could no longer be guaranteed to service any further 
loans” (Crampton and Allcock, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014). Similarly, 
Jelavich observed that by 1926 Balkan countries regained the level of production 
at pre-war years, which lasted only until 1929 (Jelavich, 1983: 184). The historical 
perspective presented by Crampton, Allcock and Jelavich, can very well be 
repeated for the analysis of the post-2008 period. The period of pre-Communist 
Party rule was also marked by the Western economic penetration into the Balkans 
and resulted in a significant dependence, as can be seen in the public debts: by 
1914, around one-third of the government revenues were used to service 
repayments (Stavrianos, 1958: 419). 
As a matter of fact, the change in the system without a significant change in 
the political-economic structure can also be seen in the post-independence period, 
as well as post-Communist Party period. Mazower (or Stavrianos among others), 
argued that the Turkish landlords were replaced by a new governing elite (similar 
to the replacement of Communist Party elite by the neo-liberal elite or a nationalist 
one in some Yugoslav examples); and that the arbitrary and corrupt Ottoman tax 
officials had been replaced by a salaried and modernizing bureaucracy (similar to 
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the replacement of arbitrary and corrupt rule of the late Communist Parties by 
international bureaucracies and yet again modernizing national ones).  
It can be said that the difference lies in the composition of the disappointed 
population: large peasant masses under the pre-Communist Party rule were 
replaced by the urban middle and lower classes (for instance, the peasant 
population in Yugoslavia fell from 78% to 29%). Likewise, a majority of labour 
and capital structurally shifted to non-agricultural activities (Lampe and Jackson, 
1982: 576). Mazower noted that peasants’ political triumph at the beginning of the 
20th century, namely independence, led to their economic ruin (Mazower, 2000: 
35-6). Moreover, Palairet observed that the independence did not necessarily mean 
economic development (Palairet, 2000: 414-5). In the same manner, one can say 
that the political victory of urban middle class in 1989 in accordance with western 
liberal values, resulted in their economic ruin with neo-liberal transition and its 
eventual/current downfall.  
2. Theoretical framework and transition process  
One of the biggest issues in the post-Cold War world politics has been the 
integration of the former centrally planned economies to the world. The collapse 
of the centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe has led to the search of these 
states for the redefinition of domestic economic and power reconfigurations as 
well as their external integration (Türkeş, 2004: 1). This signified the economic 
and political transition process, which aimed at transforming these countries into a 
Western type of liberal economy and multiparty democracy. In other words, bad 
old modernisation theory reappeared as a structurally adjusted zombie, and 
presented the market economy (as liberal as defined in the Washington Consensus) 
as the ultimate goal for the development of these countries.  
This transition process can be analysed within the framework of the 
expansion of the world capitalist system at its then current stage marked by the 
Washington Consensus. In a brief theoretical overview, it seems convenient to 
remember Wallerstein who argued that the modern world is marked by the 
capitalist world-economy which has “expanded to cover the entire earth (and 
thereby eliminating mini-systems and world-empires), and brought about a 
technological and ecological ‘explosion’ in the use of natural resources.”  In this 
sense, the world system is governed by “a singular logic and set of rules within 
and through which persons and groups struggle with each other in pursuit of their 
interests and in accordance with their values.” The guiding principle in this 
capitalist world system is the “ceaseless accumulation of capital”. Furthermore, 
capitalism and the modern state system are not two separate historical inventions 
according to Wallerstein; “neither is imaginable without the other” (Wallerstein, 
1976: 349).  The transition process reshaped the Balkans according to the global 
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economic and political system, designed to sustain the accumulation of capital in 
the neo-liberal period marked by the Washington Consensus.  
The operation of this capitalist world economy has carried out two basic 
dichotomies: The first is the dichotomy of the class, “bourgeois versus proletarian” 
within the states; and the second is the dichotomy of “the spatial hierarchy of 
economic specialisation, core versus periphery”, among the states. The latter is 
marked by¸ “an approbation of surplus from the producers of low-wage (but high 
supervision), low-profit, low-capital intensive goods by the producers of high-
wage (but low supervision), high-profit, high-capital intensive goods”. The 
capitalist system resolves its cyclical downturns by expansion: “outward spatially, 
and internally in terms of the ‘freeing’ of the market...via the steady 
proletarianisation of semi-proletarian labour and the steady commercialization of 
semi-market oriented land.” (Wallerstein, 2000: 350-1). This final point is 
particularly important on the grounds that the transition process in Eastern Europe 
has signified the expansion of the capitalist system into the countries of former 
Communist Party rule. It can be argued that it continues as it started, despite the 
crisis of the economic system beginning in 2008.  
In addition to Wallerstein, it seems fruitful to rely on the approach and 
argument by Robert Cox on the correspondence between the production, the world 
order and the form of state. Cox considered the production as a “universal human 
activity that conditions all other human activities” (Cox, 1987: 397). He argued 
that production should be understood in the broadest sense. Therefore, it does not 
solely concern physical goods. It also covers “the production and reproduction of 
knowledge and of the social relations, morals, and institutions that are 
prerequisites to the production of physical goods” (Cox, 1989:39).  The 
accumulation of resources that sustain power and authority takes place through the 
production of institutions and relationships.  In this sense, production is both a 
social process and a power relationship. He substantiated this argument by 
attempting to demonstrate different modes of social relations of production in 
human historical record.  For instance, in a self-regulating market without any 
institutional protection for labour, the relations are defined by the market. Then a 
variety of institutionalised relationships can be observed: state corporatism, central 
planning, etc. Each signifies a balance of power between the dominant and 
subordinate elements in the production process. Additionally, each is associated 
with technology, institutions, norms, and rationalities (Cox, 1987: 397). In this 
manner, the Balkan states have evolved in line within the framework of the world 
order defined by capitalism, and its contemporary stage of neo-liberal 
globalisation following the end of the Communist Party rule.  
This evolution has reached yet another stage following the 2008 economic 
crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, famous for analysing the roots of and predicting crises, 
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argued, indeed in 2008, that “The region cannot avoid the global crisis…Some 
countries will be hit directly on the trade level, others because of the fall of the 
price of raw materials…This crisis began at the centre, in the U.S., but the 
periphery will be hit the most, because exports and direct foreign investments will 
suffer. The region depends on Europe, which will suffer even greater 
consequences than the U.S.” (Zimonjic, 2008, referred to in Panagiotou, 2010; the 
emphasis is mine). The rest of this paper is to be the modest analysis of how the 
Balkans, as one periphery, has been hit. To illustrate the peripheral character of the 
region, one may look at the world rankings of these countries in GDP and GNI per 
capita (World Bank), and the use of high technology in exports as shown in the 
Tables 1-3 below.  
Table 1 
 GDP Per Capita 
GDP Per Capita (current US$) 
World Bank 2013 
Country  Per C. Rank* 
Greece 21,910 51 
Croatia 13,530 69 
Turkey 10,946 77 
Bulgaria  7,296 90 
Romania  9,499 82 
Serbia 5,935 97 
Macedonia  4,851 104 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,656 107 
Albania 4,652 108 
Kosovo 3,816 117 
Montenegro 7,126 91 
* Rank is formed by the author based on the data provided by the World Bank.  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/1W?display=default  
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Table 2 
GNI Per Capita 
GNI Per Capita 
 (World Bank, Atlas Method, US$, 2013) 




Romania  9,060 
Montenegro 7,260 
Bulgaria  7,030 
Serbia 5,730 
Macedonia  4,800 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,740 
Albania 4,700 
Kosovo 3,890 
Euro area 38,333 
European Union 34,277 
Central Europe and the Baltics 12,877 
OECD members 38,376 
World 10,564 
         Prepared by the author based on the data in World Bank.  
  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 
Table 3 
Use of High Technology in exports  
High Technology  
in % of manufactured exports 
2011 
Country  % 
Romania  10.2 
Greece 9.7 
Croatia 7.6 
Bulgaria  7.5 
Macedonia  3.9 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.0 
Turkey 1.8 
Albania 0.5 
EURO Area  15.3 
Lower Middle Income  9.3  
     Prepared by the author based on the data in World Bank.  
  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS  
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 303 
3. Anatomy of the crisis in the region 
The 1990s marked the identification of the region with poor economic growth, 
high unemployment, budget and/or current account deficits and high foreign 
indebtedness (Welfens, 2000, 102). One can read it as the re-assertion of the 
peripheral character of the region, considering for instance that Yugoslavia recorded 
the world’s second highest economic growth between (overall) 1957 and 1960 
(Crampton, 2002: 123).  
It seems generally agreed that the region was hit by the global economic crisis 
when it was just recovering from its own crisis-prone transition process and looked to 
be on the right path, particularly in the EU integration process. Since the ‘right path’ 
has been under crisis, the repercussions in the region have been dramatic to such 
extent that few can be objectively optimist, as in the following impressive summary: 
“After all their reform achievements, which had been pursued at enormous 
social and political costs throughout the course of their transition process, they are 
now confronted with yet another profound crisis-not of their making-the outcome of 
which is uncertain…Twenty years after the collapse of the communist regimes, there 
may be a growing popular sentiment in the region that the introduction of capitalism 
represented a disastrously regressive step.” (Panagiotou, 2010: 193-4). 
Indeed, in a study conducted by scholars in the region, the concern over the 
uncertainty of the duration and the cost of the crisis is pronounced explicitly (Nikolic 
et al., 2013: 54-5). One can outline the manifestations of the crisis in the region as 
falling GDP, rising unemployment rates, declining rates of investment, falling 
industrial output and growing current account deficits, decline in remittances, 
declining foreign direct investment  (Panagiotou, 2010: 190). The situation does not 
seem convincing in some other variables either: external and internal imbalances, low 
savings rate, and inadequate investment (Nikolic et al. 2013: 55). The weakening of 
economic activity is also confirmed by the reduction of foreign exchange reserves and 
increasing fiscal deficit (Ganic, 2012: 182). As a result of the decrease in the credit 
growth, domestic demand also shrunk (Risteski and Trpkova, 2012: 96). After all, it is 
observed that Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina had lower GDPs than 
the level achieved in the 1990s, while Croatia and Macedonia have pretty much the 
same. Only Albania has a higher GDP growth rate, mostly due to the low base rather 
than economic progress (Nikolic et al., 2013: 54-5).  
Simply said, all that can turn out to be a problem, did indeed turn out to be one. 
The combined effects of these problems can also be observed in the foreign trade and 
current account deficits of these countries (Tables 4-6). An additional set of figures to 
illustrate the deficiency with the integration into the neo-liberal world economy can be 
seen in the placement of Balkan countries in the global competitiveness index, as 
shown in Table 7 below.  
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Table 4 
  Trade Balance as % of GDP 
Trade Balance (% of GDP) 
(World Bank, 2012) 
Country  Balance  
(negative if not specified otherwise) 
Bulgaria  3.7 
Greece 5.0 
Turkey 5.1 
Romania  7.3 
Albania 17.8 
Macedonia  22.4 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 24.0 
Croatia 0.7 (positive) 
Serbia not available 
  Prepared by the author based on the data in World Bank.  
Table 5 
Current Account Balance  
Current account balance  
(current US$ million) (World Bank, 2012) 
Country  Deficit Rank 
Croatia -186.1 63 
Macedonia  -300.4 70 
Kosovo -484.5 76 
Bulgaria  -735.3 81 
Montenegro -769.2 83 
Albania -1314.1 96 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -1632.7 103 
Serbia -4001.9 121 
Greece -6171.9 129 
Romania  -7487.0 136 
Turkey -48507.0 148 
         Prepared by the author based on the data in World Bank.  
                http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.CD  
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Table 6 
Current Account Balance As a Proportion to GDP 
Current account balance  
(% of GDP) (World Bank, 2012) 
Country  Balance (negative) 
Croatia 0.3 
Bulgaria  1.4 
Greece 2.5 
Romania  4.4 
Turkey 6.1 
Kosovo 7.5 




       Prepared by the author based on the data in World Bank 
     http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS  
 
Table 7 
The Global Competitivenes Index Ranking 
The Global Competitiveness Index 2013–2014 
Country    Rank 
Turkey   44 
Bulgaria    57 
Macedonia    73 
Croatia   75 
Romania    76 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   87 
Greece   91 
Albania   95 
Serbia   101 
         Prepared by the author based on the data in The Global Competitiveness Index.  
         http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014  
 
It can be argued that the neo-liberal reforms of the last two decades have 
become part of the problem, rather than the solution. For instance, free trade 
damaged Balkan companies in sectors they used to be stronger such as steel, 
detergents, pulp, iron, chemicals, agriculture and apparel; because they lacked the 
capacity for economies of scale which would allow for international 
competitiveness (Fouskas, 2011: 641). For instance, the fall in demand of primary 
goods also affected the mines and thus the miners negatively, such as the copper 
mines in Macedonia, and nickel in Kosovo. It also affected the industry, such as 
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the steel factory in Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the aluminium factory in 
Montenegro. It eventually affected the income of the bulk of the societies (Dérens, 
2009). The 1990s fashion of small nation-states, as signified by the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, turned out to be detrimental to economic performance after 2008, at 
least in terms of economies of scale.   
For instance, Croatia has often been considered as the most successful 
country in the region, crowned by EU membership. However the current picture is 
controversial: high unemployment and high public debt with a negative trade 
balance; while low inflation and stable currency that must be also influential in 
higher FDI. (Nikolic et al. 2013: 55). The economic growth has been negative 
since 2009 (World Bank, 2013). Furthermore, the banking sector in Croatia 
performs badly on the measurement of liquid assets in total assets with 11.63%, 
which possibly makes the economy vulnerable to adverse effects from the 
financial markets (Ganic, 2012: 191).  The unemployment rate was 16.1% and an 
alarming 41.8 % for those under the age of 25, in the third quarter of 2014. 
(Eurostat, September 2014). Moreover, the agriculture sector accounts for just 4% 
of GDP but employs 14% of the labour force. The crisis has increased poverty 
from 10% to 14% and the profile of the poor has changed: the educated and 
younger people living in richer urban areas have also been affected (World Bank, 
2013).  
Another problem has been the significant dependence on Western Europe, as 
will be analysed in the cases of Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia in this 
article. The share of Western European foreign trade in the Western Balkan trade 
is approximately three-fifths. Additionally, commercial banks in the Balkan 
countries are generally owned by Austrian, Italian, Slovenian, Greek and French 
banks (Causevic, 2011: 366). The privatisation of banking sector had almost been 
completed. However, the low credibility of the Balkans, forced banks to borrow 
abroad at unfavourable conditions (Ganic, 2012: 178; 182). This had not been 
perceived as a problem before 2008, since the credit boom years between 2003 and 
2007 resulted in economic growth; yet in 2008-2010 the absence of these credits 
marked a downward trend in economic growth, which thus raised the cost of 
financing external debt (Ganic, 2012: 178). Therefore, worsened current account 
deficits and the efforts of monetary stability resulted in the fall in private 
investment and consumption credit, thereby decreasing labour demand (Risteski 
and Trpkova, 2012: 105). According to the Global Financial Integrity Report, in 
2011 alone, €1.74 billion was transferred out of Serbia, €1.08 billion out of 
Croatia, €677.4 million out of Macedonia, and €161 million from Montenegro 
(Likmeta, 2013). In addition to the disappointing picture of deficits, the foreign 
direct investment that was supposed to be the pillar of the neo-liberal reforms has 
fallen short of expectations, as can be seen from the Table 8 below.  
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Table 8 
Foreign Direct Investment and World Rankings 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows  
(BoP, current US$ million)  
(World Bank 2012) 
Turkey 12868.0 22 
Romania 3729.0 45 
Greece 2694.7 55 
Bulgaria 1887.7 67 
Albania 1477.8 79 
Serbia 1377.4 80 
Croatia 588.4 108 
Montenegro 446.5 114 
Macedonia 376.5 118 
Kosovo 343.2 125 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 322.1 127 
              Prepared by the author based on the data in the World Bank 
        http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD  
 
To complete the analysis of balance of payments problems within the 
framework of the anatomy of the crisis in the region,  the of indebtedness problem 
should also be considered. The external debt relative to the GNI must be also taken 
into account in order to grasp the importance of the level of indebtedness. The 
2012 figures of total external debt and the 2011 figures of public debt are as 
follows (Tables 9-10). Moreover, the public debts of all countries in the region 
increased in 2008-11, despite the fact that the average level of indebtedness of 
Balkan countries was well below the average public debt level in the Eurozone 
countries (Causevic, 2011: 360; 366).  
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Table 9 
External Debt Volume and as percentages of GNI  
EXTERNAL DEBT (2012) 
Country  $ billions % of GNI 
Macedonia  6.678 70.0 
Albania 6.934 53.1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10.577 61.1 
Serbia 34.438 94.8 
Bulgaria  50.750 102.9 
Romania  131.889 78.9 
Turkey 337.492 43.1 
Croatia ? ? 
Greece ? ? 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/6.8  
                    Prepared by the author based on the data in the World Bank.  
           http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS  
Table 10 
Public Debt Burden and World Rankings (2011) 
PUBLIC DEBT (2011) 
Country  % of GDP Rank 
Bulgaria 16.3 137 
Macedonia 34.0 107 
Romania 37.2 98 
Turkey 37.6 97 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 43.8 79 
Croatia 53.7 52 
Albania 58.8 47 
Serbia 62.0 43 
Greece 156.9 3 
    Prepared by the author based on the data in CIA World Factbook. 
 
To conclude the anatomy of the crisis in the region, its  effects to ordinary 
human life must be mentioned.  The clearest of these effect can be seen in the 
unemployment rates in these countries, as shown in the Table 11 below.  
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Table 11 
Unemployment and World Rankings 
Unemployment, total  (% of total labor force) 
(modeled ILO estimate)  
World Bank, 2012 
Country  rate  rank 
Romania 7.0 78 
Turkey 9.2 120 
Bulgaria 12.3 139 
Albania 14.7 149 
Croatia 15.8 156 
Serbia 19.6 162 
Montenegro 19.6 163 
Greece 24.2 168 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 28.2 172 
Macedonia 31.0 173 
         Prepared by the author based on the data in World Bank.  
         http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS  
 
As one can expect, the ordinary human response  has been to spend less and 
try to save more. The drop in income, loss of jobs and other effects of the crisis 
resulted in the decrease of consumption, personal investments and spending on 
higher-priced goods (Koci, 2012).. In fact, the economic growth after 2003 had 
strengthened the expectations about future incomes and profits, which had led to a 
further increase in demand for loans (Ganic, 2012: 179). Eventually, from 2009 to 
the end of 2011, the average share of non-performing loans in the total loan 
jumped from 3% to as high as 15% (Causevic, 2011: 366). One final point to be 
noted is that foreign aid has been an important component; ranging between 6 and 
6.5 billion euro per year from 1995 to 2006. However, it has been wasted due to 
corrupt officials, bad coordination and bureaucracy (Huliaras, 2011: 423). The 
next sections will try to elaborate these problems in the cases of Serbia and (FYR) 
Macedonia.  
4. Serbia 
Serbia has been an important example, not only because it is a significant 
regional power, but also because it is the one who has manifested the dramatic 
causes and consequences of the horrible 1990s.  Serbia has been perceived as the 
biggest political problem in 1990s with the nationalist aggression and currently 
displays the risk of becoming the biggest economic problem in the region. Serbia 
310 İNAN RÜMA 
is a country with a high trade deficit, increasing public debt, inflation and 
unemployment, and decreasing FDI (Nikolic et al., 2013: 54,55). While the 
average growth rate of credit to households in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia was about 25%, respectively, it was 67.7% in Serbia (Causevic, 2011: 
365). Then, it was considered normal since Serbia had a GDP growth rate of 5.4% 
between 2001-8 (Nikolic et al., 2013: 54)  
It seems reasonable to continue with the analysis of trade, as one of the main 
sources of external deficit. Serbia recorded a chronic trade deficit, and the 
significant increase in exports in the 2000s did not change the level deficits even 
slightly, since imports also increased, as can be seen in the Chart 1 below.  
 
Chart 1 
Serbia’s Foreign Trade  
 
 http://siepa.gov.rs/en/index-en/import-from-serbia/foreign-trade-data/2013.html  
 
Serbia’s production and trade structure seems to be a typical semi-peripheral 
one with relatively unsophisticated levels of technology and composition of 
industrial output, as can be observed in the Charts 2-7 below. Serbia has relied on 
exports of food and industrial intermediates such as copper and iron, which makes 
significant part of its exports. Unfortunately, the price of copper dropped by half in 
2008 (Zimonjic, 2008). The Minister of Economy Sasha Radulovic publicly 
declared the aim of financing innovation, especially in the IT sector, in the 2014 
budget (Veljovic, 2013d), which seems to address this very structural problem, 
though not very successfully. Indeed, those working in the construction, textile, 
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metal and hospitality (tourism) industries have been the hardest hit by the job 
losses after 2008 (Balkan Insight, 2012). Unemployment has become the worst in 
the region, after the long-standing examples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia. For instance, Novi Sad, the second largest town of Serbia, has been a 
typical example of Yugoslav deindustrialisation. It is now marked with 
unemployment and small IT enterprises that have been mostly dominated by larger 
European and other foreign companies. However, even this scheme provides 
employment and hence, relief to young and educated citizens (Eddy, 2013).  
 
Chart 2 
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Chart 3 
Serbia’s Export Products  
 
        http://siepa.gov.rs/en/index-en/import-from-serbia/foreign-trade-data/2013.html  
  
Chart 4 
Serbia’s Export Destinations  
 
      http://siepa.gov.rs/en/index-en/import-from-serbia/foreign-trade-data/2013.html  
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Chart 5 
Serbia’s Imports by Major Product Groups  
 
Chart 6 
Serbia’s Import Products  
http://siepa.gov.rs/en/index-en/import-from-serbia/foreign-trade-data/2013.html  
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Chart 7 
Serbia’s Import Destinations 
http://siepa.gov.rs/en/index-en/import-from-serbia/foreign-trade-data/2013.html  
As a result of these problems, Serbia had to announce ‘hard-hitting austerity 
measures’, including tax rises and cuts in public sector wages on the grounds that  
the country was close to bankruptcy as openly declared by its deputy premier. It 
was argued that it had gone backward in the reforms due to the wars of the 1990s, 
particularly in privatisations (Buckley, 2013).  The then Minister of Economy 
Radulovic seems to agree with this argument, since he similarly claimed that 
“Serbia conducted a failed economic policy in the last ten years… based on public 
consumption, imports, a state-run economy, subsidies, throwing money into a pit, 
corruption, an absence of meaningful reform and the eternal hope of foreign 
investors reviving Serbia.” The minister thought that foreign direct investment 
would solve all the problems of the Serbian economy (Veljovic, 2013c); while 
80% of the foreign investors in Serbia consider the Serbian economy to be in a bad 
state and are generally not expecting much change in the near future (Franze, 
2013). Moreover, this claim on FDI, typical to the basic neo-liberal formula of the 
1990s, has not necessarily corresponded to expectations, not only for Serbia, but 
for the entire region, as shown in the Table 8 above.  
Austerity measures and new taxes were not considered enough to avoid a 
probable debt crisis. Accordingly, easier borrowing of €3 billion from the United 
Arab Emirates and potentially higher privatization revenues could not replace 
reforms. A sharp decline in tax revenues was observed, most probably due to the 
weakened discipline of tax collection and of increased activity in the so-called 
‘grey economy.’ The possible reforms include a cut in the number of employees in 
the public administration, and pension reform (Veljovic, 2013d). As well as 
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eliminating subsidies for 179 companies, risking a significant social cost, as more 
than 20,000 workers from 600 companies are expected to lose their jobs in the 
consolidation and privatisation processes (Veljovic, 2013c).  
One consequence of privatisation can be seen in electricity production. 
Following the reform, 4,000 Serbian companies, which make up to 23% of the 
total energy market, are to buy electricity on the open market instead of the wholly 
state-owned EPS (Elektroprivreda Srbije- Electric Power Industry of Serbia). It is 
likely that the outcome of market opening will be an increase in electricity prices. 
It is doubtful whether privatisation brought in the fruits of competition so far, since 
companies that are already buying electricity on the market show few signs of any 
benefits (Markovic, 2013a). 
The reform attempts included the restructuring of the Serbian Development 
Fund that is a state-run financial institution responsible for providing cheaper 
loans for business and helping the development of the poorest regions. It turned 
out to be a corrupt institution to finance the tycoons and companies close to 
politicians, to the level that around 60% of the €2 billion in loans that the 
Development Fund issued  could not be collected. One critical view on these 
reforms has been that Serbia has to improve its infrastructure, labour laws, tax 
system and protection of competition, and deal with corruption (Andric, 2013).  
The tax reform has indeed been discussed within the framework of a 
possible progressive system of taxation of salaries. The declared aim was to make 
work in the so-called shadow economy unprofitable, and to make manufacturers 
more competitive compared to importers by reducing the cost of labour. 
Employers’ associations generally supported reducing the tax burden on low 
earners, considering that it could have positive effects on employment and on the 
competitiveness of labour-intensive industries. Indeed, a progressive tax system 
for wages can favour low-skilled, low-paid workers and employers in labour-
intensive industries, such as textiles. However, the doubtful points seem to be 
concerned with the increase in the already high budget deficit and/or excessive 
increases in other taxes. It can harm moderate, middle-class earners more than the 
very wealthy, on the grounds that a progressive tax is easier to implement on 
salaries than on those whose wealth comes from capital. Moreover, it is argued 
that the highly skilled workers, such as engineers and IT experts, would have 
problems with higher taxes (Veljovic, 2013a). In this sense, the reform attempts 
with considerations of social peace may well result in the sustainment of periphery 
status due to the fact that labour-intensive sectors would benefit more.  
After all, squeezed by all these problems, Serbia has interestingly tried to 
enlarge its international capability of maneouvre, although it is difficult to argue 
whether it was abandoned by Europe. For instance, in one survey on foreign 
investors in Serbia, presented by the German Ambassador to Serbia, the 
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ambassador indeed said that “Serbia is a crucial country in the Balkans for 
Germany, both politically and economically”; yet this arises from the peripheral 
position of the country that has a skilled workforce coupled with low labour costs 
(Franze 2013).  
The ‘return to’ Russia after a hopeful relation with the EU should not be that 
surprising, especially when the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is in question. The 
energy cooperation with Russia has resulted in constructing part of the South 
Stream natural gas pipeline through Serbia, though it does not have the proper 
industrial and technological capability for this investment. Therefore, Russian 
Gazprom will dominate this partnership both with expertise and capital; Serbia 
will finance its part by taking out loans from Gazprom itself and commercial 
lenders, mainly Russian banks. Serbian President Nikolic, in order to demonstrate 
the economic benefits of the project, claimed that around 25,000 workers will be 
hired to work while 100,000 other workers will benefit indirectly. This so-called 
‘pro-Russian turn’, which disturbed Western European ambassadors in Belgrade, 
was explained by the Serb officials that the West did not respond to Serbia’s needs 
of a ‘strategic partner’ (Markovic, 2013b). However, this search for an alternative 
does not necessarily change the peripheral status as evident in Gazprom’s 
dominance in this partnership.  
One may argue that indeed Serbia has not been essentialist in its search for 
international support for its unsuccessful economy. The fear  of imminent 
bankruptcy reached such a level that Serbia sought loans from the UAE, despite its 
anti-Islamist rhetoric since the 1990s. The UAE extended loans with interest rates 
lower than those of the international markets and has been particularly interested 
in the defence industry and even bought 49% of the loss-making Yugoslav airlines 
JAT (Buckley and Kerr, Financial Times, 2013). The new company, Air Serbia, 
begun operations after the decision of partnership with Etihad, to succeed the 
Yugoslav JAT, after 66 years of its existence. The expectation is obviously profit 
and a possible regional leadership in air travel. It should also be noted that the 
Serbian state will have to cover the debts left by JAT Airways, amounting to 
around €170 million (Veljovic, 2013b).  
It would not be in line with the Zeitgeist if China is not mentioned in the 
framework of searches for new international partners. Indeed, China has expressed 
a sustained interest in expanding trade and investment in the region, particularly in 
infrastructure such as roads, ports, high-speed railways, and strategic sectors such 
as telecommunications and nuclear energy. Although tempting amounts such as 10 
billion US dollar have been mentioned, actual investment has so far remained 
limited. It seems that Chinese investments in the region are to be an issue in near 
future, considering also the appetite of the region’s politicians (Chiriac, 2013).  
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5. Republic of Macedonia  
Macedonia has been an interesting example, as it is the only former 
Yugoslav republic in the Balkans which could avoid extensive wars. Indeed, it is 
now considered as one of the least influenced by the economic crisis. It has 
implemented a ‘shock therapy’, adhered to a liberal model of economy, and was 
crowned with  WTO membership (Nikolic et.al., 2013: 56). The establishment of 
the market economy can be seen in the privatisations: the share of the private 
sector in GDP quadrupled in one decade, from 15% in 1990 to 60% in 2001; and 
private bank capital in total became 77%. However, at the end of this rapid 
liberalisation, the GDP was still 77% of the 1989 level (Jeffries, 2002: 348; 352; 
356). It should be noted that Macedonia received international aid at about $400 
million per year from 2001 to 2003 and $250–300 million per year in the 
following years (Fery, 2005: 20, referred to in Huliaras, 2011). 
The mainstream narrative of the Macedonian economy has portrayed also a 
positive outlook with serious problems. CIA World Factbook summarises the 
Macedonian journey starting from its status of least developed Yugoslav republic 
producing just “5% of the total federal output of goods and services” through the 
deadly early years of independence marked by the absence of infrastructure, UN 
sanctions on the rump Yugoslavia, and the Greek economic embargo which 
delayed economic growth until 1996. However, it is noted that since then, 
Macedonia has maintained macroeconomic stability with low inflation, although 
the lack of FDI and high rates of unemployment have often been serious problems.  
The Economist carries out the same picture in 2014 in the context of 2008 
economic crisis. It considers Macedonian recovery relatively successful by 
regional standards. Its contraction by 0.9%, is followed by an average 2.9% 
growth in 2010-1. However, the economy continues its dependency on external 
factors for growth and especially on FDI inflows, remittances, and export demand 
(The EIU Country Report, 2014). One should not think that the existing foreign 
investment could be taken for granted as it was introduced.  For instance, the 
Greek banks benefited from a 28 billion euro government bailout package, yet this 
did not include their investments in Macedonia (Panagiotou, 2010: 192). Finally, 
Macedonia is vulnerable to economic developments in Europe due to its trade 
linkages.  
However, the problems outlined in some studies are also striking. Major 
problems were outlined such as increase in foreign trade deficit and a decrease in 
manufacturing employment (CPRM National Report, 2012).  Macedonia has been 
faced with a deficit in trade balance, although it improved its export-import ratio 
up to the level of  around 55%. (Nikolic et al., 2013: 56.). By August 2013, 
through issuing state bonds, the public debt to domestic creditors reached 39% of 
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GDP (Marusic, 2013b), which is still the second-best in the troubled region. The 
deficit is to be financed through continuous debts from Deutsche Bank and the 
World Bank as well as through domestic borrowing. 
The biggest problem has been observed in the manufacturing sector, 
particularly in the ferrous metal industry, parts of the automotive industry and 
textiles. To note, metals and textiles are the biggest export sectors of the country. 
The Macedonian economy is rather small and non-competitive, and has been 
highly dependent on imports and certainly on the demand for exported primary 
and intermediate goods. Therefore, the decrease in the demand for metals in the 
world markets in 2009 seriously affected the economy (CPRM National Report, 
2012). The output dropped by 6.6% in 2012, and the decrease in the industrial 
output was 8.8%.  Exports have dropped by 10.2%. The metal and construction 
industries, which represent the core of the economy, have been seriously affected, 
while the mining and textile industry slightly improved after significantly 
shrinking in 2011. The metal industry made up 35% of Macedonia's exports and 
employed 15% of the country’s workers. The industry saw a drop in output of 11% 
in 2012 due to decreased demand in Europe (Marusic, 2013a).  
Macedonia’s major exports have been Reaction and catalytic products 
(15%), ferroalloys (10%), non-knit women's suits (4.3%), Centrifuges (4.0%), and 
refined petroleum (3.6%). Major export partners have been Germany (28%), 
Serbia (14%), Bulgaria (7.2%), Italy (6.6%), Czech Republic (4.6%), and  Greece 
(4,2%). Import partners have been nearly the same: Greece (13%), Germany 
(10%), United Kingdom (9.0%), Serbia (7.1%), Italy (6.0%), and Bulgaria (5,8%).  
(Observatory of Economic Complexity, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/country/mkd/). 
Most Macedonian exports are intended for the German market which creates a 
dependence on the demand there for the Macedonian economy (Kotevska, 2013). 
This dependence shows the peripheral status of the production.  
The repercussions on poverty and unemployment have already been 
alarming. Macedonia has already been notorious in the international mainstream 
media for its unemployment, which is the highest in Europe. The poverty rate 
grew slowly in 1997-2002, when it stabilized to as high as 30% in the period from 
2002-9. The 2008 crisis came onto an already high unemployment problem: the 
employed mostly remain employed, and the unemployed remain unemployed for a 
long time in any case. Unemployment  has reached the highest levels in the food 
industry, mining, transport, storage and communications. The constant high level 
of unemployment is partly explained through the gray/informal economy, which 
was officially assessed to be 35% of the GDP (in 2004) in which 30% of the 
unemployed were actually working (CPRM National Report, 2012). A recent 
study estimates the informal economy lies around %24 of the total GDP in 2010 
(Garvanlieva et al., 2012).  
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Finally, Macedonia has portrayed a different picture also concerning the real 
estate sector. The economic crisis resulted in the drastic shrinking of the real estate 
business; the cost of real estate has fallen by 30% to 50% across the region. 
However, in Macedonia, the economic crisis did not affect the real estate sector 
even when the Macedonian Stock Exchange lost approximately 20 percent of its 
value in the past year (Koci, 2012). As a matter of fact, the GDP growth which is 
the essential point of the recovery after 2009 was based mostly on construction. 
Indeed, the Economist noted that “construction was a key driver of growth, with 
this component of GDP expanding by an average of 34% year on year.” The major 
construction work "Skopje 2014" which includes the construction of a number of 
monuments, museums and government buildings will be finished (EUI Report, 
2014). This gives the impression that Macedonia can also suffer from bursting of 
the construction bubble, at least when “Skopje 2014” is  over.  
6. Conclusion 
Looking from a political economy perspective, the Balkans have manifested 
a peripheral character. The Balkan states of the early 1990s wanted to escape from 
the peripheral status that the late Communist Party rule of the 1980s seemed to 
condemn. This would be done with the transition process that aimed to transform 
the central command economies to liberal free market economies and the single 
party regimes to multiparty democracies. The shortcomings of the process have 
been interpreted through the deficiencies of the Balkan countries. The problem 
was located in the incompatibility of the periphery to the core; few could predict 
that the core would be in crisis. The relative success of the Balkan countries in the 
2000s, which gave the impression that the peripheral character had been eased, 
was undermined by the 2008 global economic crisis. The reflections of the crisis 
can be seen in decreasing GDP, domestic production and rising unemployment, 
budget deficit and indebtedness in Balkan countries, which had already been 
grappling with considerable problems even before the crisis under neo-liberal 
transformation. This study aimed at outlining this gloomy picture in order to grasp 
the framework in which the social forces of Balkan countries are bound to operate 
in order to be able to influence decision-making. Following a decade of 
destruction through violence and a decade of destruction under the name of 
reconstruction through neo-liberal policies, the conclusion is the reassertion of the 
peripheral character of the Balkans. One can only hope that the gloomy path 
signified in the mainstream by Sarajevo 1914 (eruption of the First World War) 
will be changed by Tuzla 2014 that has been the locus of widespread social 
protests against both neo-liberalism and nationalism. 
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Özet  
2008 Ekonomik krizi: Merkez-çevre ilişkilerinin Avrupa merkezi ve Balkanlar 
arasında yeniden üretimi 
   1990'lara damgasını vuran, merkezi planlama ekonomilerini serbest piyasa ekonomisine ve tek parti 
yönetimini çok partili demokrasiye dönüştürmeyi amaçlayan geçiş süreciydi. Sonucu daha ziyade Balkanlar'ın 
çevre ülkelerine ait özelliklerinin yeniden üretimi oldu. Sürecin sıkıntıları sanki bu ülkelerden 
kaynaklanıyormuş ve onların hatasıymış gibi sunuldu. Merkezin krize gireceğini pek az kişi öngörebilmişti. 
Merkez'de başlayan 2008 krizi doğrudan Balkanlar gibi çevreyi etkiledi ve işsizlik ile bütçe açıkları arttı. Savaş 
yıkımları ile geçen bir onyılın ardından, bir onyıl da neo-liberalizm altında yıkım ile geçtikten sonra, Balkanlar 
gene çevreleşme süreci yaşamaktadır. Bu çalışma bu çevreleşmenin yeniden üretiminin nasıl gerçekleştiğini 
incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.        
Anahtar kelimeler: Siyasi iktisat, Balkanlar, geçiş, kriz, merkez-çevre. 
